










Benefit-Cost Analysis of Environmental Projects: 




Philip E. Graves 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3144 









An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Benefit-Cost Analysis of Environmental Projects: 





There are many reasons to suspect that benefit-cost analysis applied to environmental policies 
will result in policy decisions that will reject those environmental policies. The important 
question, of course, is whether those rejections are based on proper science. The present paper 
explores sources of bias in the methods used to evaluate environmental policy in the United 
States, although most of the arguments translate immediately to decision-making in other 
countries. There are some “big picture” considerations that have gone unrecognized, and there 
are numerous more minor, yet cumulatively important, technical details that point to 
potentially large biases against acceptance on benefit-cost grounds of environmental policies 
that have true marginal benefits greater than true marginal costs, both in net present value 
terms. It is hoped that the issues raised here will improve future conduct of benefit-cost 
analyses of environmental policies. 
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After several decades of research in environmental economics, it has become increasingly clear 
to me that benefit-cost analysis of environmental policies—as currently practiced in the U.S. and 
elsewhere—is strongly biased against acceptance of those policies.  The purpose here is to bring 
together in one place as many arguments as possible to bolster this position in order to provide 
grist for discussion.  It is hoped that such discussion will yield improved methods for the conduct 
of future benefit-cost analyses in the environmental area. 
  The nature of the biases against adoption of environmental policies are many, ranging 
from a potentially serious unrecognized theoretical problem of public good valuation to specific 
technical details of the valuation methodologies in use.  Section II briefly discusses a flaw in 
public good valuation generally, noting that this flaw is likely to be of particular importance in 
the  environmental  policy  setting.    Special  interest  power  is  seen  to  be  concentrated  against 
potential environmental policies vis-à-vis other policies (e.g. national defense) where special 
interest power promotes policy adoption.  This section presents a ―big picture‖ argument for a 
bias against environmental programs.  
  Section III also deals with a big picture issue.  This section examines the implications of 
the—potentially clashing—motives that underlie marginal willingness-to-pay for environmental 
quality,  concluding  that  the  common  valuation  methods  of  economics  are  generally  biased 
toward ―use values‖ versus ―non-use values.‖ 
Section  IV  turns  to  a  host  of  ―little  picture‖  specific  methodological  flaws  in 
environmental valuation that collectively imply significant and systematic bias against adoption 
of environmental policy.  Section V concludes, finding that there is compelling evidence that 
environmental benefit-cost analysis is biased against the environment.  II. Valuing Environmental Public Goods 
As discussed in extensive detail in Graves (2009), a flaw in public goods valuation has gone 
unrecognized  for  over  a  half-century.    Early  in  Samuelson‘s  (1954)  well-known  paper 
characterizing the nature of optimal public goods provision, he notes that inputs are just like 
outputs except for a minus sign in front of them—we want more output from fewer inputs.  Later 
in this famous contribution, Samuelson notes that it will be extremely difficult in practice to 
observe  the  demands  for  public  goods,  because  individuals  have  no  incentive  to  voluntarily 
reveal their demands, rather having an incentive to ―free ride.‖  This renders collective decision-
making about public goods levels very difficult. 
  However, in any situation in which there is an incentive to free ride in output markets, 
there will also be an incentive to free ride in input markets.  That is,
1 since we work to acquire 
the  goods  that  we  desire,  if  a  class  of  goods  (e.g.  public  goods)  cannot  be  individually 
incremented from work effort, that effort will not be undertaken since leisure is valuable.   
Individuals will work to pay for whatever amount of the public good happens to be provided, but 
is it likely that the proper amount of the public good will be provided? 
  For  some  public  goods,  such  as  national  defense,  special  interest  power  is  likely  to 
promote  the  provision  of  battleships,  tanks,  aircraft,  missiles  and  the  like.    The  potential 
providers have an incentive to portray their goods in a positive light and to lobby Congress in 
various  ways  to  obtain  contracts  making  provision  profitable.    The  amount  of  such  goods 
provided might very well be the right amount or perhaps too much as is emphasized by the 
public choice literature.  Whatever amount of such goods happen to be provided, the costs of 
                                                           
1 See Graves (2009) for detailed discussion: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1119316 . 
 provision, borne by working taxpayers, will result in optimal increases in work effort to pay for 
such goods along with the private goods desired. 
  However, the case for environmental public goods is quite different; indeed, for most 
environmental policy, special interests are likely to be aligned against any policies that would 
raise the cost of producing goods.  Illustrating with but one industry, automobile manufacturers 
have  fought  against  seatbelt  requirements,  airbag  requirements,  and—notably  for  present 
concerns—catalytic convertors. 
  In such cases, regulation will only emerge when the growing demands of a larger and 
richer populace overcome resistance to government intervention by entrenched special interests 
and others who on ideological grounds desire limited government.
2  Any such intervention is 
likely to begin conservatively with very low provision goals, such as early EPA requirements for 
exhaust  gas  recirculation  systems  for  more  complete  burning,  reducing  both  unburned 
hydrocarbons (now VOCs) and carbon monoxide, CO. 
  At conservative initial provision levels, it is likely that a properly-conducted benefit-cost 
analysis would favor many additional environmental policies.  But there is an inherent inability 
to properly conduct benefit-cost analysis in this case—the non-optimally low initial provision 
levels  will  result  in  a  non-optimally  low  work  effort,  hence  income  generated  is  also  non-
optimally low.  And, critically, all of the ungenerated income would have been spent on the 
public good, abstracting from  general  equilibrium  effects.
3  That is, benefit-cost analyses of 
                                                           
2 I should perhaps point out that I am firmly in this latter camp, in general.  I believe that government does so many 
things it should not be doing at all that it fails to do at all well the things that it should do. 
3 The point is not merely that the justifiable amount of public good provision will be larger if those conducting the 
analysis recognize that the optimal income  generated will be larger at a higher provision level (see Flores and 
Graves 2008 on endogenizing income in benefit -cost analyses).  Rather, the  initial  income  level  is  wrongly 
presumed to be an appropriate starting point for the analysis when it is not. environmental public goods are currently being conducted at the wrong income levels because of 
free riding in input markets.
4 
  What this implies, from a policy perspective, is that the difficulty is not just attempting to 
solve the well-known demand revelation problem out of a given income.  Rather, the initial 
income is itself inappropriately low because of the fully symmetric, but unrecognized, demand 
revelation problem in input markets.  
  As a practical matter, starting from the conservative initial environmental provision level, 
environmental projects should be accepted even if apparent costs exceed apparent benefits since 
the actual benefits will be inevitably larger than those perceived out of the given initial income.  
In other words, when regulators produce increments to environmental quality up to the point 
where observed marginal benefits equal observed marginal costs out of current income, they are 
under-providing environmental quality by some unknown, but possibly large, amount.
5 
  Existing efforts (see e.g. Clarke 197 1, Groves and Ledyard 1977) to solve the demand 
revelation  problem  have  been  largely  moot,  requiring  quasi-linear  preferences  as  but  one 
limitation.   The ungenerated income of interest here represents additional , but unobserved, 
marginal benefits for any environmental good under consideration—the apparent marginal rate 
of substitution between environmental and ordinary private goods becomes distorted, making 
environmental goods ―look‖ less valuable on the margin than they are. 
  Is there any corroborative evidence to indicate that the theoretical problem discussed here 
may be of any practical significance?  Yes.  A body of experimental economic research reveals a 
                                                           
4 The more important environmental and other public goods are relative to private goods in the utility function, the 
less income will be generated, an extreme case being perhaps the ―hippie drop-outs‖ of the sixties.  The ―lazy‖ 
person who desires little in the way of either private or public goods is observationally equivalent to the person who 
desires very large amounts of public goods and modest amounts of private goods—each might generate the same 
income, hence are indistinguishable to the benefit-cost analyst. 
5 One might argue that those desiring environmental public goods can pursue other avenues to achieve their goals, 
perhaps volunteering or engaging in the political system to attempt to ―make a difference.‖  However, the same 
incentive problem plagues these alternatives, hence too little of such efforts is forthcoming.  large gap between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept (see Horowitz and McConnell 
2002 for a summary).  There might be many reasons for such a gap.
6  However, the finding by 
Horowitz and McConnell that the WTA-WTP gap is by far the largest for public goods, suggests 
the possible importance  of  the arguments  presented in  this  section.
7  For  example,  when 
contemplating small increments to air quality people will  often express quite small marginal 
willingness-to-pay, but will claim to require order -of-magnitude larger amounts to compensate 
for equally-small decrements to air quality.  The ungenerated income resulting from the input 
market demand revelation problem  would add to the WTP, greatly reducing the gap, and 
suggesting that WTA might perhaps more closely approximate properly measured WTP. 
  The public good valuation flaw discussed in this section has further implications for the 
conduct of benefit-cost analysis beyond the expectation that the benefits in the numerator are 
understated.  As with free riding at a point in time, free riding is to be expected for intertemporal 
decisions as well.  Suppose that the bequest motive is comprised of desires to make our offspring 
better off, both in terms of wealth comprised of ordinary goods and wealth in the form of an 
improved environment.  To the extent that the latter matters, free riding incentives again suggest 
that the savings rate will be lower than would otherwise be the case.  Those giving bequests will 
realize that the portion of their bequests that they would like to have  devoted to environmental 
improvement is likely to be negligibly small relative to marginal provision costs.  Hence smaller 
bequests will be made from lower saving rates. 
  The implication of this is that the social rate of discount in current use for public goods 
lacking strong special interest support is  at least to some extent  biased upward.  The use of a 
                                                           
6 See Kahneman et al. 1990 or Tversky and Kahneman 1991 for psychological notions of ―endowment effect‖ or 
―loss aversion.‖  See also Boyce et al. 1992 and Hanemann 1991 for additional explanations.  
7 Plott and Zeiler (2007) argue that the gap is due to fau lty experiments; however, their example to establish their 
position is a private good example, leaving the issue unresolved for public goods. lower social discount rate for benefit-cost analysis of public goods of this type would result in 
acceptance of more environmental policies.  I suspect that this problem is not of great magnitude, 
but its importance is largely unknown for the same reasons it is difficult to establish how much 
free riding occurs in ordinary output or input markets. 
III.   The Psychological Underpinnings of Willingness-to-Pay for Environmental Goods 
Economists seldom care ―why‖ people like the goods that they buy, not caring, for example, 
whether the ―ice cube motive‖ is more or less important than the ―fresh produce motive‖ for 
purchasing a refrigerator.  The only exception to this appears in the money demand literature (the 
medium of exchange, asset, and precautionary motivations for money holding), but even here it 
makes  no  practical  difference—the  money  demand  analyst  still  looks  for  price  and  income 
elasticities in exactly the manner that they would if they completely disregarded why people 
wish to hold cash. 
  In the case of the environment, there is a very good reason for examining the various 
motives  that  underlie  the  marginal  willingness-to-pay,  because  there  are  clashes  in  the 
underlying motives that have potentially important policy implications. 
  The critical distinction is between ―use values‖ (e.g. snowmobiling in Yellowstone Park 
or  observing  the  sandhill  cranes  in  Nebraska)  and  ―non-use  values‖  (e.g.  preservation  of 
Yellowstone Park or leaving undisturbed the sandhill cranes).  The non-use values are sometimes 
further sub-categorized into a) option to use, b) bequest, and c) preservation/existence.  The 
reason that the distinction is critical for present purposes is that the methods used by economists 
to value environmental resources are best at valuing the use values.
8 
                                                           
8 As discussed in the following section, being ―best‖ at valuing use values relative to non-use values does not mean 
that the methods employed by economists are at all good at capturing use values.   By way of illustration, 318 snowmobiles and 78 multi-passenger snowcoaches (usually 
with 15 passengers each, or 1,070 passengers per day) are currently allowed into Yellowstone 
each day during the winter.  Assuming the winter has 100 days of good snow cover, there would 
be 31,800 snowmobile and 107,000 snowcoach visitors.  If each of the former had a WTP of, 
say, $1,000/day and each of the latter a WTP or $200/day, the aggregate value of winter visitors 
to Yellowstone would be $53.2 million dollars ($31.8 million going to snowmobilers and $21.4 
million going to snowcoach passengers).  This is a quite large amount of use value; moreover 
there is a fair degree of certainty around this number—it is unlikely to be an order of magnitude 
larger or smaller.   
But the winter visitors also stress the park animals during the harsh winter period when 
food is scarce and their presence in recent years has resulted in winter park pollution levels 
rivaling Houston, TX.  Continuing the example, suppose that each of the approximately 115 
million  households  in  the  U.S.  would  be  willing  to  pay  $.50/household/year  (about 
$.20/person/year) to keep Yellowstone pristine in the winter, with cleaner air and less stress on 
the park animals.  If true, the non-use value of the park is $57.5 million dollars.  Were we 
equally certain about both the use value numbers and the non-use value numbers, the efficient 
environmental policy would be to not allow winter visitors to Yellowstone Park.
9 
We  are,  of  course,  not  equally  certain  about  the  two  numbers  (I  pulled  the  $.50 
preservation value from thin air with no justification at all other than that it seemed ―plausible‖), 
because non-use values generally come only from so-called ―constructed market‖ experiments 
(contingent valuation, conjoint analysis, etc.).  Such experiments attempt to elicit values from 
                                                           
9 It should be noted that preservation values might well come from those in other countries, adding value that might 
be completely ignored by the country contemplating appropriate policy.  For example, Americans might have a true 
willingness-to-pay of a fairly large sum to preserve the habitat of the panda in China or the mountain gorilla in 
Rwanda, but those values are unlikely to register in those countries. respondents for a wide range of goods and literally thousands of papers have been published 
purporting to value various goods, environmental goods being the focus here. 
Real controversy about the constructed market approach did not develop until the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill in March of 1989.  Since large amounts of damages were at issue, the debate 
about the validity of directly elicited valuations became quite heated.
10  A NOAA panel was 
convened, headed by two Nobel-prize winning economists (Kenneth Arrow and Robert Solow), 
with  the  charge  being  to  determine  whether  constructed  market  methods  were  ―capable  of 
providing estimates of lost nonuse or existence values that are reliable enough to be used in 
natural resource damage assessments.‖   
After many meetings and wide-ranging  testimony  from  experts on both sides of this 
question, the NOAA panel concluded in a January 15, 1993 Federal Register report that ―CV 
studies [applications of the contingent valuation method] can produce estimates reliable enough 
to be the starting point of a judicial process of damage assessment, including lost passive use 
values.‖  However, the report also made specific recommendations about the how constructed 
market  surveys  should  be  conducted  that  would  appear  to  lead  to  ―conservative‖  damage 
estimates, underestimating preservation values rather than overestimating them.  The issue is still 
unsettled and it remains the case that economists and others are strongly divided over whether 
numbers derived from surveys can legitimately be employed in benefit-cost analysis. 
For present purposes, however, there is one point that must be emphasized: the only 
method  currently  available  for  the  determination  of  preservation/existence  values  is  that  of 
constructed markets.  It is inevitably the case there will be at least some circumstances in which 
preservation value will be large relative to use value and if constructed market valuation is not to 
                                                           
10 For an excellent lead-in to the history and methodology of contingent valuation see Portney (1994).  His overview 
piece is followed by several articles both pro and con by various experts. be allowed, preservation/existence values will be ignored in environmental policy regardless of 
their magnitude. 
Summarizing to this point, there are strong theoretical reasons to suspect that both use 
and non-use benefits  are understated in  environmental benefit-cost  analyses  (because  a free-
riding sub-optimal income is assumed to be optimal), and moreover use values are likely to 
dominate environmental policy, even when true preservation/existence values are larger (because 
of the reluctance to accept constructed market valuations).  Are there further reasons to suspect 
that even the use values themselves are measured with downward bias?  
IV.   Valuation Methods in Common Use and the Role of Damage Perceptions 
Apart  from  voting/referenda  methods,
11  there  are  two  primary  valuation  methodologies  in 
widespread use in environmental benefit-cost analysis.  The most intuitively obvious is referred 
to here as the ―Sum of Specific Damages Approach‖ (sometimes this is referred to as ―The 
Health Effects Model,‖ because typically only health effects are analyzed).  The second approach 
looks at relationships between environmental goods and ordinary goods to infer the former‘s 
value  and  is  widely  known  as  ―The  Hedonic  Method.‖
12  Within  each  approach  there  is 
substantial likelihood that important benefits will be ignored as these methodologies are typically 
applied.    The  primary  focus  here,  however,  is  on  the  nature  of  the  implicit  assumptions 
underlying  each  approach  and  what  those  strongly-opposing  assumptions  imply  about  true 
willingness-to-pay for improvements in environmental quality. 
 
                                                           
11 Since many environmental benefits (e.g. mortality and morbidity) are concentrated among a small number of 
individuals, their intensity of want fails to be picked up in a one-person/one vote mechanism.  Benefit-cost analysts 
attempt to aggregate benefits and costs weighting each individual by dollar willingness-to-pay not weighting each 
individual identically, so I forego discussion in the main text of, for example, California‘s green propositions.   
12 There are many detailed reviews of both of these approaches, but here are two recent ones: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542074 (Sum of Specific Damages) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542072 (The Hedonic Method) The Sum of Specific Damages Valuation Method 
  The idea under the SSD approach is to first gauge how much an environmental policy 
will reduce physical damages, ∆Di, of a wide variety.  There are hundreds of studies relating 
various levels and types of pollution (e.g. particulates, sulfur dioxide, ozone, or lead) to physical 
damages taking many forms, such as asthma, cancer, cardiovascular disease, chronic bronchitis, 
hospital  admissions,  lead  neurotoxicity  and  blood  pressure  effects,  mortality,  respiratory 
infections, and work loss.  A dollar value, $Vi, is then placed on each category of damage, with 
for example a prevented life lost being valued at perhaps $5 to $7 million, and the prevention of 
an asthma attack much less. 
The marginal benefits of the policy are, then, the sum of all of the reductions in physical 
effects times their respective values: 
1) Marginal benefits = ∑(∆Di)$Vi 
The reduction in physical damages is usually further decomposed into: 
2) ∆Di = bi * POPi * ∆EQ 
where: ∆Di = change in population risk for health effect i, 
bi = slope of the dose-response function for health effect i, 
POPi = population at risk for health effect i, 
∆EQ = change in environmental quality, measured as pollution reduction. 
Illustrating, suppose that an environmental policy is being contemplated that is expected 
to lower fine particulate pollution levels by 5 micrograms per cubic meter in some populous 
region.  Assume that the net present value of the benefits of this change in air quality is one life 
per million people and the elimination of 100 cases of chronic bronchitis per million people.  If there are eight million people in the region affected by the policy, then 8 lives will be saved and 
800 cases of chronic bronchitis will be eliminated in present value.   
Further assume that a saved life is ―worth‖ $5-7 million dollars, with a best point estimate 
guess of $6 million and an eliminated case of chronic bronchitis is worth $50,000 (perhaps based 
on contingent  valuation or some other stated preference mechanism  as  discussed in  earlier).  
Then the policy would have present benefits of 8 x $6,000,000 + 800 x $50,000 = $88,000,000. 
If these are the only benefits of the policy and it can be put in force for a present cost of $88 
million or less, it would be efficient to adopt the policy since it would have marginal benefits 
greater than or equal to marginal costs, a positive net present value. 
The preceding example can be used to illustrate all three major problems with the SSD 
approach.  First, the physical effects due to the policy, ∆Di, are highly uncertain; although we 
―supposed‖ that 8 people would not die and 800 would not acquire chronic bronchitis if the 
policy  were  put  into  effect,  such  estimates  are  very  uncertain.  In  testimony  prior  to  the 
implementation of the environmental policy, some experts may argue that the damages prevented 
will be large, while others will argue that the damages prevented may be very small.  In part this 
stems from advocacy positions–an expert working for the American Lung Association is more 
likely to predict more bronchitis cases prevented by the policy than an expert working for the 
National Association of Manufacturers. The final determination of damages will likely depend 
on some mix of the credibility/credentials of the experts and the quality of the analyses they 
present. 
Where  do  experts  of  either  stripe  get  their  information?    There  are  three  primary 
approaches (toxicological, clinical, and epidemiological) with epidemiological studies tending to 
carry the most weight.  Clinical studies are used to address research questions that can be well examined in laboratory settings.  In a human clinical study, scientists investigate the effects of 
individual air or water pollutant ―doses‖ by measuring a variety of health effects (e.g., lung 
function,  heart  rate  variability,  blood  component  analysis).    Clinical  studies  are  themselves 
usually  initiated  in  response  to  prior  biological  studies,  either  in  vitro  or  in  vivo  in  animal 
surrogates for humans.  The latter provide information about the way pollutants generate their 
molecular effects, and such animal and in vitro studies are particularly important when human 
data is unavailable or when such data cannot be ethically obtained. 
Epidemiological studies, while less rigidly controlled, offer more natural settings through 
the  statistical  analysis  of  data  from  human  populations  or  by  field  studies.    In  some  cases, 
researchers follow fairly large groups of individuals and use detailed questionnaires to relate the 
incidence of various disease endpoints to pollutant levels.  Field studies involve fewer individual 
observations  and  employ  repeated  assessments  of  health  effects  of  pollution  exposure.    The 
smaller numbers of subjects involved in field studies allow researchers to extend the information 
obtained in large scale epidemiological studies by including measurements of clinical health 
endpoints.  Various epidemiology studies have, for example, implicated particulate matter in 
premature death among elderly individuals with cardiopulmonary disease and to increased use of 
medications, doctor visits, and hospital visits for individuals with pulmonary disease such as 
asthma. 
Toxicology studies attempt to identify and study the specific properties and constituents 
of various pollutants that are responsible for causing adverse health effects.  Toxicologists test 
the molecular, cellular, and systemic effects of pollutants in experimental settings using cell and 
tissue cultures, animals, and computer models. As already indicated, findings of dose-response effects from a toxicology study might prompt the initiation of either or both clinical trials and 
epidemiological investigations. 
Knowledge is gained from the various approaches, but there remains great uncertainty at 
the policy level about how physical effects relate to pollution exposures.  This is particularly so 
for  chronic  pollution  effects,  such  as  perhaps  a  long-latency  cancer,  vis-a-vis  the  more 
immediate acute effects.  When certain physical effects are difficult, for various reasons, to tie to 
pollution,  they  will  tend  to  be  ignored  in  the  SSD  approach,  leading  to  understatement  of 
damages.  Death or cancer at least have clear definitions, but certain forms of pain, dermatitis, 
neurological effects, various endocrine disruptions and the like are difficult even to quantify, let 
alone relate to pollution, hence are likely to be ignored in practice. 
Returning to the example of how Equation 2) might be used (or misused), the second 
source of uncertainty is on what values to place on the physical effects that are predicted to 
occur.  Is the ―value of statistical life‖ (VSL) $6 million?  Or, is it one-tenth or ten times that? 
Could the value of a chronic bronchitis case be an order of magnitude greater or smaller than the 
$50,000 used in the illustration?  One might argue that values such as these are at least plausible, 
and  one  could  make  a  fairly  strong  case  for  the  argument  that  there  is  greater  uncertainty 
regarding the physical effects estimated by the epidemiologist than there is regarding the values 
placed on them by the environmental economist. 
Neither of the uncertainties discussed to this point would seem to point to any obvious 
downward bias in damage estimates. There are two important reasons to suspect that such a 
downward bias exists, however. First, the physical effects should be all of the physical effects 
that will occur as a result of the policy, not just (a portion of) the health effects.  If a policy 
cleans up the air or water, it will have physical benefits of a wide variety, not just mortality and morbidity benefits.  There will generally be ecosystem improvements, agricultural crop yield 
benefits, material damage reductions (e.g. house painting with less frequency), benefits for pets, 
as well as aesthetic effects (e.g. smells, visibility).  Since we get all of those effects as a result of 
the policy they all should be counted, yet in practice they never are. 
There  is  an  additional  theoretical  and  practical  problem  with  the  SSD  approach  that 
strengthens the claim that too little environmental quality will be produced if this approach is 
used to estimate the benefits of environmental policies.  For this method to ―work well‖ as a 
measure of pollution damages, people have to be unaware that pollution has any impact on the 
damages.  That is, the impact of pollution on, say, health has to either be unknown to households 
or they must be unable to determine where it is clean and dirty. The environmental source of the 
damages has to be unperceived.   
If the damage and its cause were perceived by individuals, they would be expected to 
engage in costly mitigating behavior
13 (sometimes referred to as ―averting‖ behavior), to the 
point where marginal benefits of mitigation equaled marginal costs of mitigation—and the saved 
mitigation costs should be added to the marginal benefits of the environmental policy.  Since 
such mitigation costs never are added to environmental benefits calculated by the SSD, analysts 
are at least implicitly assuming that such costs do not exist, i.e. that individuals do not perceive 
the causes of their health damage. 
We turn now to an approach to valuing environmental improvements that relies on a 
polar opposite assumption, namely that damages from environmental pollution (hence benefits 
of environmental pollution cleanup) are perfectly perceived. 
                                                           
13  We  might  not,  for  example,  exercise  outside  on  high  pollution  days,  we  might  install  dust  filters  or  air 
conditioning in part to avoid air pollution, we might move to a less-preferred but cleaner location, and so on. In the 
case of water, we might buy distilled water, or install water filters, as a means of avoiding damages from polluted 
surface reservoirs or aquifers. In all of these cases, scarce resources are expended to avoid a damage that otherwise 
would have happened. The Hedonic Valuation Method 
Two ways that people can avoid pollution damages are by locating in cleaner towns 
and/or by locating in cleaner parts of a given town.  The appropriate use of this method is taken 
up in some detail here, since the hedonic method is commonly misused and that misuse generally 
leads to downward-biased estimates of environmental values. 
The fundamental notion underlying all hedonic methods is merely that people like to 
make  themselves  as  well  off  as  possible,  exactly  the  assumptions  that  we  make  about  their 
behavior in ordinary markets.  Other things equal, we would all prefer to live in a cleaner town 
or live in a cleaner part of a given town.  The idea with hedonic methods is to examine how 
much households are willing-to-pay in land and/or labor markets to live in cleaner locations, 
since they will in general have to pay, as we shall see.  The main ideas are really quite simple, 
but  to  gain  a  clear  understanding  of  this  method  we  shall  first  consider  wage  and  rent 
compensation separately (as is often done, though this is in general incorrect as we shall see).  
An ―integrated‖ model that was first formally presented by Roback (1982) and later implemented 
empirically by Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988) is then described in some detail. 
A) Hedonic Methods: Wage Compensation 
Some labor market regions are more polluted than others, and households will have to be 
compensated for the pollution they experience to be willing to work in dirtier cities.  That is, if 
City A (one of two otherwise identical cities) has higher pollution levels than City B, residents 
would move from A to B reducing the labor supply in A (raising wages) while increasing the 
labor supply in B (lowering wages). The movements would continue to occur until the wage 
differential just compensated people for the higher average pollution in City A. One extremely 
desirable feature of this approach is that it gives us exactly what we want, the net present value of marginal willingness-to-pay in dollar terms, which can then be compared to the marginal costs 
of policies yielding that amount of cleanness. 
  The actual process requires as much data as possible on individual wages as well as the 
determinants of wages for people at various locations (education, experience, age, occupation, 
region,  union,  etc.)  to  which  are  added  measures  of  environmental  quality  levels  in  those 
locations.    With  this  information  accumulated  a  regression  analysis  is  then  performed  to 
statistically relate the wage (as the dependent variable) to those determinants.  There is little 
theoretical guidance on functional form–degree of linearity, interactions among variables, and so 
on. This raises the possibility that researchers inadvertently, and advocates deliberately, might 
distort environmental values by their choices along a number of dimensions. 
  The coefficients on the environmental quality variable will indicate how much impact a 
given change in environmental quality has on wages, holding constant other wage determinants. 
In this way, the trade-offs between environmental goods and other goods that people also value 
can be directly measured. Since higher levels of environmental quality are a desirable trait of a 
labor market area, we would expect that wages would be lower in the high-environmental quality 
locations since the supply of labor would be greater to such areas.  If environmental quality 
differences  across  labor  market  regions  are  not  perceived  or  if  people  don't  know  how 
environmental quality affects them, the true benefits of cleaning up will be understated by this 
method–one  would  not  expect  households  to  accept  wage  cuts  for  unperceivable  benefits. 
However, a large number of wage studies (see Bockstael and McConnell 2007 for a nice review 
in the present context) indicate that households are willing to give up wages to live in cleaner 
locations. 
   B)   Hedonic Methods: Property Value or Rent Compensation 
  The property value/rent compensation method of hedonic valuation translates the logic 
that underlies the labor market studies to the housing market.  How much a house will sell or rent 
for is clearly related to the nature of the traits that the house possesses. Some of those traits are 
―structural,‖ such as whether it is constructed from stone or wood, square footage, number of 
bathrooms, size of lot, presence of pool or tennis court, type of heat, and so on. Other traits relate 
to location such as ―neighborhood‖ variables (school quality, freedom from crime, access to 
various  destinations,  and  so  on).  These  latter  traits  are  ―location-fixed‖  public  goods  whose 
prices end up being bundled together into the price of the house along with its structural traits. 
Environmental quality, viewed from this perspective, is just another location-fixed trait that is 
desirable from a household‘s perspective. 
  Assuming perceptions are perfect and that we have a competitive housing market, the 
value of clean air must be paid for in higher prices for houses in areas having higher air quality. 
If we can determine how much people are willing to pay for an otherwise identical home in a 
clean location versus a dirty location, we will again have a measure of exactly what we want, the 
present value of the marginal dollar willingness-to-pay for environmental quality, which can then 
be compared to the present dollar marginal cost of environmental quality. 
  The  process  is  quite  similar  to  the  wage  hedonic  approach,  first  requiring  as  much 
information as possible about the traits–structural, neighborhood, and environmental quality–of 
all houses (in what is hopefully a large sample), along with their property values and/or contract 
rent. In an ideal world, the property value (the dependent variable) would be the actual sales 
price, but sometimes information is used from multiple-listing books, scaled up or down by the 
going ratio of list price to exchange price.  The property value is next regressed against its structural  and  neighborhood  determinants.    The  empirical  analysis  involves  many  possible 
functional forms, with non-linearities, synergisms, and the like possibly being important.   As 
with  the  wage  hedonic  approach,  there  is  little  theoretical  guidance  on  the  nature  of  the 
functional relationship between property values and their determinants which enables researchers 
accidentally—and  advocates  intentionally—to  publish  very  different  conclusions,  even  from 
identical raw data.  The coefficients on the environmental quality variables reveal how much 
impact  a  given  change  in  environmental  quality  will  have  on  property  values  for  average 
households.   That is, the trade-off between environmental quality and other goods can be directly 
measured, and since higher environmental quality is a desired trait, we expect to observe higher 
house prices or rents in cleaner areas, other things equal. 
  As with wage studies, property value studies suffer from problems stemming from the 
assumption  of  perfect  information.    Suppose  that  people  don't  fully  perceive  the  impact  of 
pollution on their health and well-being or how the pollution levels vary across locations or both.  
The first possibility is quite plausible, since even the ―experts‖ have widely varying opinions 
about the amount of physical damage, particularly health damage stemming from pollution, as 
discussed in the section on the sum-of-specific damages approach.  As to the second possible 
perceptual  difficulty,  many  pollutants  are  odorless,  colorless,  and  tasteless  in  ambient 
concentrations commonly encountered, so it might be difficult for the average person to even 
know whether a particular house is in a high-pollution or low-pollution location.  If buyers don't 
properly perceive all of the damages from pollution or if they cannot tell which locations are 
dirtier, the benefits estimated by this approach will be understated.  As with the case of wage 
compensation, people will not be expected to pay for something without tangible benefits.  Many studies, however, show strong positive relationships between property values and environmental 
quality.  
  C) Wage and Property Value Differentials Are Not Alternatives 
  Until  fairly  recently,  the  preceding  hedonic  approaches  to  valuing  environmental 
improvements were viewed as alternative approaches.  That is, it was thought that one could find 
out what clean air was worth either by examining property value variation in land markets or by 
examining wage variation in labor markets.  The approaches were viewed as alternative ways of 
measuring the same environmental preferences.  Indeed, if the values happened to be similar 
under the two methods, greater confidence was placed in either as a measure. 
  It turns out that this is incorrect under plausible assumptions about peoples‘ behavior 
when evaluating locations.  Indeed, for this view to be valid, it must be the case that people 
follow a two-stage procedure in picking a location.  First, only looking at wages (and average 
pollution levels), they pick a location among alternative labor markets; only then, having settled 
on a labor market, do they select a location within that labor market based on housing price and 
pollution variation within that area. This would clearly be irrational since households would do 
much better in general by looking at the combination of wages, rents, and amenities available in 
all locations prior to selecting their location. 
  Another way to think about this is that, between two otherwise identical locations, the 
one that is more polluted will be less attractive, so people will move from the more-polluted to 
the less-polluted location until they are equally well off in both locations.  But, as they move into 
the  less-polluted  location  they  both  increase  the  supply  of  labor  (driving  down  wages)  and 
increase the demand for land (driving up rents). Hence, the ―true‖ value of the less-polluted locations is the sum of what is being paid  for reduced pollution in both the labor and land 
markets. 
  At the level of theory, the preceding has been known since at least 1982, with convincing 
empirical  verification  being  provided  by  1988.
14  Yet many recent studies continue d, and 
continue at this time, to be conducted employing a single -market compensation methodology.  
This is perhaps partly because the data for such studies is typically easier to come by when only 
one market is employed, but also partly because  it is  possible that compensation for specific 
environmental amenities can occur in either the land or labor market separately.
15   
  Clarifying, what is an amenity to  households might be a disamenity to firms (e.g. a city 
introducing an expensive pollution control policy that helps households but harms firms).  In this 
case, wages will definitely be lower (households enter increasing labor supply, while firms exit 
reducing labor demand), and the effect on property values /rents is ambiguous, depending on 
whether  the  city  be comes  larger  or  smaller  as  a  result  of  the  policy.   Similarly,  if  an 
environmental policy happened to be good for both firms and households (e.g. reductions in fine 
particulate that improve health and perhaps lower production costs of microchips), the benefits to 
households would appear largely in property values, with perhaps negligible impact on wages—
whether wages would rise or fall would depend on whether the amenity was relatively more 
important to households or to firms. 
                                                           
14 Roback (1982) first presented the theoretical arguments for multi-market amenity compensation in a convincing 
way, while Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988), in a large study funded by the EPA, demonstrated empirically that 
proper valuation of environmental goods requires the summation of compensation in both labor and land markets; 
moreover, they found that there is wage variation even within large labor market areas using county-level data.  In 
an excellent recent empirical study Kuminoff (2007) finds, in a nested analysis comparing results from a traditional 
property value approach, that his ―new ‗dual-market‘ framework increases estimates for the average per/household 
marginal willingness-to-pay by as much as 110%.‖ 
15 Indeed, it is the case that the compensation shares are not even limited to being between zero and unity.  That is, 
depending on how important the amenity is for firms relative to households, it is possible to have 150 percent of the 
amenity value occur in one market and -50 percent occur in the other.   It seems quite likely that hedonic methods would under-state the value of environmental 
quality improvements, even if a properly-conducted multi-market methodology were employed.  
The most obviously damaging observation is that the benefits of environmental quality must be 
fully perceived by households for them to be willing to pay more for cleaner locations.  As 
indicated earlier, even the world‘s foremost health experts have spirited debates about the role 
various pollutants play in human disease and death.  It seems implausible that ordinary people 
would  be  able  to  accurately  perceive  such  things–moreover,  since  many  pollutants  are  not 
detectable by our senses in normal ambient concentrations, it is not even likely that ordinary 
people would be able to distinguish the clean places from others. 
  Why do hedonic property value and wage studies show such large environmental effects 
then?  It is certainly the case that people will perceive localized smells, bad visibility, and other 
impacts of pollution that are inevitably revealed by our five senses. Yet, it is precisely such 
perceived damages that are ignored in the sum of specific damages (SSD) approach discussed 
earlier.    The  SSD  environmental  valuation  method  assumes  that  damages  (typically  health 
damages) are unperceived merely occurring to people at greater rates in dirtier locations.   
  Given the nature of the assumptions about preferences, the two approaches clearly cannot 
be  viewed  as  alternatives,  as  is  implicitly  the  case  when  one  methodology  is  selected  in 
preference to the other.  A much stronger case can be made for adding together the damages 
estimated from an SSD study to those of an hedonic study to get the true damages, those both 
perceived and unperceived.  Such a procedure might result in some double counting, since an 
area that is unhealthy might also smell bad, but it is likely that the two methods pick up largely 
unrelated damage categories, those perceivable and those that are not perceivable by households.   This point is quite important in practical environmental situations, whether in regulatory 
rulings or in court testimony. The benefits of environmental cleanup are estimated either from a 
SSD type of approach or an hedonic type of approach, but the estimates are never added together 
which would in many cases would double the estimated benefits of cleanup. 
  An additional reason for expecting the hedonic method to understate true benefits is that 
the hedonic method–even properly conducted–only captures use benefits of the environmental 
resources of concern, since the amenities are bundled with housing and jobs.  As discussed in 
Section III, non-use benefits might well be of greater magnitude in particular environmental 
settings,  and  policies  allocating  the  environmental  resource  should,  on  efficiency  grounds, 
encourage  highest  value  allocation–even  if  that  results  in  ―nonuse‖  of  the  environmental 
resources. Illustrating, is the California Coastal Commission properly allocating scarce ocean 
locations?  It is clear that in the absence of this regulatory authority virtually the entire coast of 
California would be lined with high-rise condos, looking much more like Miami‘s South Beach 
area than at present.  But, the scenic Pacific Coast Highway has value to all who drive it, and to a 
large extent that value has been perceived as being of greater importance than the (admittedly 
very  large)  benefits  households  would  receive  if  the  coast  were  opened  to  unrestricted 
development.  Similar observations would apply to Central Park in New York City. 
  The final reason why hedonic methods might be expected to understate the benefits of 
environmental cleanup stems from the relative supplies of clean locations relative to the relative 
demands for clean locations.  The behavior underlying the hedonic method results, at least in 
principle, in  zero  spatial  consumer surplus.    That  is,  if one location is ―nicer‖ than another 
location, households will continue to move to the nicer location, until it is no longer nicer–until 
identical locations have identical full compensation.  There will be no consumer surplus over space, and indeed this is one of the reasons the hedonic method is desirable in that the full 
benefits that are perceived are measured.  Were people all homogeneous, as the ―representative 
agent‖ models of economics typically assume, zero consumer surplus over space might well be a 
reasonable expectation. 
  But, the fact that people are very different means that understatement of environmental 
benefits (damage reduction) can occur if there are more locations with the amenity than there are 
people strongly desiring the amenity.  Suppose, for example, that there are very few households 
containing really sick individuals, individuals with weakened cardio-pulmonary systems who 
would be highly damaged by pollution.  Such households might be willing to pay a great deal for 
a very clean location, but they might only have to pay a much smaller amount, if the number of 
―somewhat clean‖ locations is large relative to the number of these households.  They will get 
consumers‘ surplus over space.  Inferring the value of cleaning up the environment from the 
average  person  in  this  case  would  ignore  the  high  marginal  benefits  received  by  these 
households.    When  one  considers  the  very  large  number  of  traits  that  can  matter  to  a 
heterogeneous population with very diverse preferences, it becomes clear that a great deal of 
consumer  surplus  can  remain  in  the  hedonic  equilibrium—households  are  not  indifferent  to 
where they locate. In the case of incrementable environmental goods, the unobserved consumer 
surplus  corresponds  to  a  higher  marginal  value  that  might–if  observed–justify  a  policy 
intervention to increase levels of the public good.   
V.  Conclusion: Environmental Valuation As Practiced Is Biased Against the Environment 
 
As  an  initial  observation,  we  argued  that  some  public  goods—such  as  many  environmental 
goods—will tend to not only lack special interest support, but will actually have powerful special 
interests aligned against them.  Hence initial provision levels are likely to be quite low relative to optimal  provision  levels.  Regardless  of  initial  provision  level,  rational  individuals  will  not 
generate  income  to  increment  a  class  of  environmental  goods  that  are  not  individually 
incrementable.    These  observations  imply  that  benefit-cost  analysis  of  environmental  public 
goods are being conducted with the wrong income levels and all of the ungenerated income 
would have been spent on environmental public goods, apart from general equilibrium effects. 
  We then went on to observe that the non-use values, preservation and existence values in 
particular, are poorly captured by the methods in widespread use by economists.  The methods of 
economics,  primarily  the  sum  of  specific  damages  method  and  the  hedonic  method,  both 
concentrate exclusively on use values, when it will certainly be the case that some environmental 
amenities will have a higher value to society collectively if preserved.     
  Moreover, both of the damage estimation methodologies in common use, the SSD and 
hedonic methods,  understate damage  as they are typically  conducted.  The  hedonic  approach 
requires  perfect  perceptions  of environmental benefits  along with  perfect  knowledge of how 
environmental  quality  varies  over  space.    Moreover,  it  remains  the  case  that  expert  legal 
testimony and typical regulatory practice still typically employ either a property value study or a 
wage  study,  despite  knowledge  available  for  more  than  two  decades  that  compensation  for 
environmental  amenities  and  disamenities  will  generally  occur  in  both  the  land  and  labor 
markets. 
  The SSD approach requires zero damage perception to be accurate and, moreover, tends 
to omit many health and other effects (e.g. material damage, minor health effects, views), while 
emphasizing acute damages rather than the more difficult to study chronic damages. 
  A strong case can be made for applying both methods to specific environmental policies 
being  evaluated  in  a  benefit-cost  analysis  and  adding  the  benefits  of  a  properly  conducted hedonic analysis to the benefits obtained from the sum of specific damages approach.  There 
might be some double-counting in this process, but it is unlikely that this source of bias would 
offset the biases within each methodology that lead to understatement of environmental values. 
  We have focused here almost exclusively on the issues associated with benefit estimation 
in  environmental  benefit-cost  analysis.    There  are  cost  issues  as  well.    Traditionally,  many 
analysts, partly tongue-in-cheek, say that the actual costs will end up being twice what they were 
predicted to be a priori.  But, these casual observations are normally directed at projects (e.g. 
dams,  airports,  and  the  like)  that  have  substantial  special  interest  support  and  which  are, 
furthermore, usually eligible for federal cost-sharing.  Federal cost-sharing creates incentives to 
pursue  projects  with  local  benefits  greater  than  local  costs,  regardless  of  overall  project 
efficiency.  These projects are politically preferred to typical environmental projects, despite the 
latter  offering  learning-by-doing  cost  savings  along  with  scale  economies  in  provision, 
suggesting that cost estimates are likely to be overstated for environmental projects.
16   
  There are additional reasons, perhaps slightly more speculative than the arguments in the 
main text sections, for suspecting that benefit-cost analysis of environmental projects is biased 
against their acceptance.  Expected future population growth and likely increases in income have 
impacts that are generally ignored in environmental benefit-cost analysis.  Many environmental 
policies will confer benefits over long time periods into the future (e.g. it took many years for the 
catalytic-converter  equipped  automobiles  to  predominate  on  American  roads;  long -lasting 
                                                           
16 The recent arguments of Hahn (2010) provide an at least partial offset to those of the main text.  I would argue 
that the very pronounced downward bias in benefits discussed here are likely to more than offset any cost-side 
concerns associated with the regulatory process.  Moreover, it is quite easy to find examples of policies in which the 
costs were a priori argued to be quite high, but were found later to be much lower (e.g. an elaborate 4-point race car 
seat belt can be acquired for $10-14 each in quantity and even the less-expensive old-fashioned lap belt reduced 
traffic fatalities by 30 to 50 percent).  As another example, automobile manufacturers expressed great concern about 
the cost of required catalytic converters on cars built after 1974.  Catalytic converter production technology has been 
systematically improved (e.g. laser welding instead of instead of conventional TIG welding) and prices now range 
from $70 to perhaps $300 in various configurations.  The catalytic converter has had a huge impact on urban air 
quality, particularly in rapidly-growing Western cities.  stationary source controls such as baghouses, scrubbers, and the like provide clean air for many 
years after their introduction).  If population growth is occurring at one-percent a year
17 and per 
capita  income  is  growing  at  two -percent  a  year, the  numerator benefits  of  environmental 
improvements would be growing at three-percent a year under a conservative assumption that the 
income elasticity of demand for environmental quality is unity (most  economists who have 
studied this issue would argue that environmental quality is a superior good, with income 
elasticities of perhaps 1.5).   
  One of the reasons the preceding observations take on importance is that benefit -cost 
analyses of environmental policies tend to be only infrequently conducted —a  rejection  on 
benefit-cost  grounds  of  an  environmental  policy  at  one  point  in  time  does  not  mean  that  a 
rejection would occur at a later point in time when population and income are both larger.    
  When all of the arguments presented here are considered as a whole, it seems difficult to 
deny that benefit-cost analysis as applied to environmental projects is biased against acceptance 
of those projects.  While the specifics here have dealt with environmental policies, it is likely that 
the central concerns would apply to many other areas of benefit-cost analysis (e.g. safety, health 
or natural hazards) where special interest lobbying is either weak or in opposition to ―deeper 






                                                           
17 For some countries currently, and many others in the future, population growth may well be negative, which 
would reverse the text argument.  The growth of income is likely to more than offset population declines, however, 
in the overall growth of numerator benefits from environmental policies. References 
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